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Politics has been deﬁned as the constrained exercise of social power
(Goodin and Klingemann 1996, p. 7). In turn, power can be described as
the ability of A to get B to do what A wants, which B would not otherwise
do (Dahl 1957); or, more precisely, as an inverse function of the cost to A
of getting B to do what B would otherwise not do.
Politics as I have deﬁned it is absent from perfect markets. Indeed,
the “perfect market,” as an ideal point, is the absolute zero of politics—
the point from which measurement starts. In a perfect market, no one has
power, since no agent gains inﬂuence over any other agent.
Real markets are imperfect. They involve some degree of bargaining.
And they are embedded in political institutions. Political context mat-
ters—a major reason why so few generalizations about the “best” policy
to follow seem to be valid.
Most of what we know analytically about bargaining comes from
economics and decision science—especially from game theory—more
than from traditional political science. That is, the models of causal
mechanisms come from economics. And this audience understands the
ins-and-outs of speciﬁc bargaining in the international monetary system
better than I do. You have been speaking and writing the prose of politics,
as I have deﬁned it, even if you thought you were engaged in the poetry
of economics. I feel a bit like the man who survived the Johnstown ﬂood
and then led a most unremarkable life except for being a bore to his
friends. When he died, St. Peter told him he had a right to a “show and
tell” the ﬁrst afternoon in Heaven. Since the man had only one important
event, the Johnstown ﬂood, he talked on and on about that until St. Peter
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Noah’s in the audience.” What, then, can a political scientist who has not
been focusing on the speciﬁcs of bargaining over monetary issues
contribute? Are there any gains from interdisciplinary exchange?
You will be the judge. My own view is that both economic modeling
and international monetary policymaking often fail to make explicit the
political variables that affect the results of particular economic policies.
Our discussion this morning, for instance, implicitly agreed that countries
should choose ﬂexible or pegged exchange rate regimes, or impose
capital controls, only “under some conditions,” but the conditions were
not systematically speciﬁed. If speciﬁed, some of them would surely be
political. Economic analysis alone is like a laser: precise, well-focused, but
only illuminating a small part of the environment. Political science is like
a ﬂashlight—maybe a dim one—illuminating a larger area, but less well.
My approach this evening will be to use political science concepts to
formulate hypotheses that might be provocative for discussion and,
perhaps, useful in the future for research. Gertrude Stein on her deathbed
is reported to have said to her friend Alice B. Toklas, “Well, what is the
answer?” Receiving no answer, Stein then asked, “Well, then, what is the
question?” Similarly, I am going to try to raise some questions, rather
than pretend to give answers.
The deﬁnition of politics that I have borrowed speaks of social power
“within constraints.” Choices—so cogently analyzed by economics in
certain domains—are made under constraints. To understand outcomes,
we need to understand the constraints. The positive aspect of this talk
proposes some conjectures about the constraints within which power is
exercised in the contemporary international monetary system.
The other aspect of this talk is normative. What are the values at
stake, and how should we think about the trade-offs between them? I will
spend my last few minutes on these issues, and especially on the issue of
both creating and constraining power. Harold James told us last night
about Napoleon III. I will counter with James Madison.
Both aspects of these talks have the same punch line. The collective
consequences of self-interested behavior are often bad even in self-
interested terms, and therefore they generate rational attempts to orga-
nize institutions to change incentives. To understand the system, and
how to modify it, we have to understand its institutionalized constraints.
FIVE CONSTRAINTS
1. The Self-Interests of Politicians
The micro-foundations of the politics of the international monetary
system are domestic, since leaders are chosen domestically. Hence,
monetary policies and international agreements must be in the self-
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governments. So we need always to keep in mind what Robert Putnam
has called a “two-level game,” domestic and international (Putnam 1988).
Three conjectures: 1) Since “the economy, stupid,” is crucial to
electoral prospects of incumbents, the most important long-term deter-
minant of overall policy in large liberal democracies will be public beliefs
about the effects of international monetary policies on the domestic
economy. 2) In the short term, in these democracies, the most important
determinants of overall policy will be opportunities to blame one’s
opponents, or to avoid blame oneself. One example is the GOP’s
agreement to provide extra funding for the International Monetary Fund
after the ﬁnancial crisis of last fall; they hoped to avoid blame for any
further crises that might occur after Russia’s default. 3) In many coun-
tries, even liberal democracies, the interests of concentrated sectors and
large ﬁrms will be more important, on speciﬁc issues, than public
sentiment, especially if the issues are not widely publicized. On such
issues, to understand policies, one needs to identify the key members of
the ruling coalition. These may be export sectors, as Sebastian Edwards
argued with respect to Chile. They may be local bankers—the “crony
capitalism” of IMF lore. Or they may be money-center banks in the
United States, as in the Korean debt restructuring of late 1997.
2. Linkage
The world monetary system is clearly a central component of the
world political economy, but it is “nested” within political-military
relationships involving physical security. This morning we discussed the
difﬁculties of building credible domestic or international monetary insti-
tutions, but no one pointed out that the critical motivations for building
such institutions—in Europe but also in countries such as Singapore and
Taiwan—were security concerns. The European Union and the Marshall
Plan are cases in point, of course. These institutions were erected and
reinforced primarily for political reasons. Economic motivation alone was
not sufﬁcient to overcome the disincentives to bearing the costs of change.
Similarly, during the Cold War, security concerns led the United States to
relax economic pressure on its partners. And in 1995 the United States
relaxed trade pressure on Japan in order to avoid jeopardizing the
U.S.-Japanese alliance, which was in turn seen as crucial to the policy of
engagement with China.
Two conjectures: 1) Large and painful institutional changes are often
facilitated by political-security concerns. 2) When supposedly “conﬂic-
tual” security issues become involved, U.S. economic policy, including
ﬁnancial policy, often becomes more cooperative. Think of Russia, Korea,
Taiwan, or even the overall justiﬁcation for including China in the World
Trade Organization. One reason for this tendency relates to the “two-
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American people to be generous when their security is supposedly at
stake.
3. Credibility
Possession of information is clearly a crucial resource in world
politics: Asymmetric information is a source of power. But the obverse is
also the case: Credibility is a key power resource in the information age
(Keohane and Nye 1998). Who can lend credibility? The Bundesbank and
the Fed. Who needs to borrow it? The French, Italian, and Argentine
central banks. These asymmetries of credibility tell us a lot about power
in the international ﬁnancial system.
Conjecture: Variation in credibility is a better predictor of ability to
achieve national objectives in the international monetary system than is
variation in economic size. Furthermore, the credibility of state institu-
tions depends ultimately not on institutional tricks but on the coherence
of the society, and on the quality of the society’s mechanisms for
resolving social conﬂict (compare Rodrik 1999).
4. Multilateral Institutions
We often think of inﬂuence simply in terms of bilateral bargaining,
using asymmetric resources. But much political activity in the contem-
porary world political economy takes the form of multilateral persuasion.
Much of the persuasion within multilateral institutions, like bilateral
bargaining, rests on assessments of material interests. States that have
clear interests pursue them, in part by bargaining for support from
others, and in part, as Lawrence Summers (1999) has recently empha-
sized, by using “peer pressure” to induce others “properly to pursue their
own interests.” For this sort of bargaining, standard game-theoretic
models are helpful. Actors selectively communicate private information,
they update on other apparent “types,” they bluff or call.
But a distinctive feature of modern multilateral institutions, not
always captured in the models, is that precedents matter. As a result,
members of these organizations who have no direct stakes in a conﬂict
have to think not only of the side-payments they might be offered to favor
one side or the other, but also of the impact of their decisions on rules and
precedents. This is not to suggest that agents without direct interests will
act pro bono publico. But the potential impact of a current decision on
unknown future cases creates a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” situation, in
which decisions are important to actors who cannot know their conse-
quences for themselves.
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collective interests may be increased by the institutionalization of deci-
sionmaking.
5. Exit and Voice
Exit options—open to mobile individuals, ﬁrms, and factors of
production—amplify power. Exit magniﬁes voice but reduces incentives
to use it (Hirschman 1970). The impact of exit on voice is conditional on
institutions. Speciﬁcally, in the absence of credible institutions and
effective democratic governance over markets of substantial size, exit
options will amplify voice. That is, mobile factors, especially capital, will
wield disproportionate inﬂuence. Democratic institutions reduce the
power of exit by providing mechanisms for voice to immobile individu-
als. Credible authoritative institutions, over a market of sufﬁcient size, are
necessary for making democratic decisions effective in markets.
Conjecture: Democratic publics will support both the extension of
economic market areas and credible economic institutions, when they can
be persuaded that these are means to maintain effective democratic
governance in the information age. Democracy should, in the long run, be
conducive to the expansion of the domain for authoritative governance.
GENERALIZATIONS
It would be highly misleading to view international monetary
politics as an interacting system of unitary self-interested actors deﬁned
entirely by their size, location, and factor endowments. Equally important
are attitudes and institutions within societies, and the character of
international institutions. The overall lesson is the same as the one to
draw from Douglas North’s work (North 1990), or from David Landes’s
recent book (1998) on the wealth and poverty of nations: Institutions
matter. Institutions are path-dependent social constructions. They are
very difﬁcult to create and, once in place, they are hard to change; and to
a considerable extent, they deﬁne incentives, capabilities, and constraints
for the exercise of power.
NORMATIVE ISSUES
Politics involves not only empirical issues but also social purpose.
The study of politics, and policy, is therefore normative as well as
positive. In the world political economy, we are—and should be—always
concerned about efﬁciency. And any policy measures are constrained by
considerations of political feasibility. But the efﬁciency-feasibility rela-
tionship does not fully deﬁne the trade-off structure: We should also seek
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three associated normative propositions.
1. Autonomy and Local Control
What is the desirable trade-off between efﬁciency, on the one hand,
and autonomy on the other? The naive “economistic fallacy” is to assume,
positively, that efﬁcient solutions will always occur, and normatively, that
they are always desirable. The result is Dr. Pangloss’s view, satirized by
Voltaire in Candide, that “all is for the best in this, the best of all possible
worlds.”
The normative proposition I would like to offer is that the value of
protecting autonomy depends not only on the trade-off with efﬁciency,
but also on the quality of deliberation and on the degree of democratic
representation in national decisionmaking. Autonomy for democracies is
valuable; autonomy for autocracies and kleptocracies is not.
2. Equity
There is a three-way trade-off among efﬁciency, political feasibility,
and equity. I conceive of equity in terms of Amartya Sen’s notion of equal
opportunity to realize one’s capabilities, behind a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance about one’s own position (Sen 1999). Since power and wealth
are highly correlated, the politics of this trade-off are weighted against
equity. Politics is the “mobilization of bias” or even the institutionaliza-
tion of bias. Thus, equity is not naturally served by the political system,
even in democracies.
My normative proposition about equity is that those who seek to
manage the international monetary system should seek to “lean against
the political wind.” They should work against the wealth-power bias that
is so evident in modern politics, and therefore seek to promote equity at
the margin.
3. Creating and Constraining Power
In the long run, important economic institutions are political. Dem-
ocratic publics will support such institutions only if they perceive them as
meeting their interests. Individual international institutions can hardly be
expected to be accountable on the domestic model; but if the overall
process does not make the policy process transparent and the key policy
outcomes responsive to the wills of democratic publics, it will not be
sustainable. In this sense, it is an illusion to try to “depoliticize”
international institutions—it will not happen, and it should not happen
because political support is a crucial condition of our important economic
institutions.
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Federal Reserve System is extremely popular. And the U.S. public
fortunately does not demand that the IMF be minutely accountable to the
whims of a majority of the U.S. House of Representatives. Policy
effectiveness can also be a source of legitimacy and political support. So
it may be possible to insulate institutions from short-term political
pressures even if, in the long run, political support will be essential to the
viability of institutions and the success of economic policy. In the
twenty-ﬁrst century, we will need a “Madisonian moment” on an
international level. That is, we will have to ﬁgure out how simultaneously
to create and constrain power.
How are we to both create and constrain power? Like Gertrude Stein,
I do not have the answer, but I think we should raise the question. In
thinking about this question, I go back to the premise of the English
Utilitarians: that human nature cannot readily be changed, but that
human beings respond to institutional incentives. We need to create
institutions with the capacity to act, but also recognize, in Lord Acton’s
phrase, that “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 51 is the best conceptual guide to this
issue: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difﬁculty lies in this: You must ﬁrst enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.”
We are unlikely to proceed to world government in the twenty-ﬁrst
century, but if peace and prosperity are to prevail, we must create
institutions of governance that “control the governed” while themselves
being controlled. The ﬁrst part of the next century will have to be a time
of institution-building. Thinking about how to build effective institutions
will beneﬁt from deep and extensive exchange between students of
economics and students of politics.
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